Despite all the disillusion and cynicism over the UN's peacekeeping performance in the past 10 years, there seems no alternative but to take whatever practical measures are possible to reform and revitalise the organization. There may be more efficient and streamlined vehicles on the road, but the UN is the only one in which everyone consents to travel.
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and encountered a host of difficulties in sustaining both personnel and operations. Operationally, UN commanders also faced interference from governments contributing troops, difficulties reconciling the agendas of a multiplicity of third party organisations and actors (all with differing mandates and sources of accountability), and not least the variable quality and cultures of troops under command. All of these factors contributed to UN peacekeeping missions exhibiting a rather ad hoc feel, demonstrating the attributes of a temporary activity rather than a core function of the UN. 6 The crisis in the management and sustainment of peacekeeping missions coincided with a broader 'conceptual' crisis that challenged the credibility and relevance of the tool itself. The application of peacekeeping in circumstances where the belligerents' commitments to cease-fires were questionable or where they resented the nature of the UN mandate brought into question its utility. This problem was compounded by the multiplicity of forms in which 'peacekeeping' operations manifested themselves.
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By 1995 this three-dimensional crisis had manifested itself in terms of a lack of trust in the capacity of the UN to manage large-scale missions in volatile environments. This was reflected in a reduction in the expectations heaped upon the UN system. In some ways this was a pity; and it coincided with a raft of measures, often initiated by the Secretariat, designed to overhaul the capacity of the UN to manage its own operations. Empirically, the contraction was seen in what transpired to be a somewhat short-lived reduction in the pace of authorisation of new peacekeeping missions and the renewed reliance upon traditional principles of consent plus a tangible commitment to a sustainable peace or cease-fire. Nevertheless, largely as a consequence of missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the numbers of troops deployed in active missions began to climb once more. Furthermore, several of the conceptual difficulties re-emerged, largely as a consequence of operational difficulties encountered by the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
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Problematising command: the perennial problems
To begin to understand the reasons why the UN confronted this threedimensional crisis it is worth dwelling on the normative attributes of a military organisation capable of setting and realising objectives. For such an organisation to work effectively it requires the clear definition of political objectives and their effective and realistic translation into
